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I. INTRODUCTION 
While Minnesota was confronting a budget impasse in 2017, 
culminating with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton,1 New Mexico was experiencing a 
similar struggle over an item veto of appropriations for the state legislature 
and public higher education institutions. Legislative staffs in both states 
were well aware of each other’s efforts and have since shared their 
experiences. Those joint collaborations may have led the Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review to seek a New Mexico perspective as part of Issue 2 
of Volume 45, which considers separation of powers doctrine topics. The 
author was pleased to accept the invitation, leading to the submission of 
this introspective look at the New Mexico experience.  
Part II of this article provides a brief summary of the separation of 
powers doctrine from its origins to its application in federal and state 
constitutional law. The focus throughout is on the inevitable tension which 
arises when applying a doctrine of separateness that all agree cannot, and 
should not, be rigorously applied. Part III then turns to the item veto 
provision (often referred to as the line-item veto) that allows a governor to 
veto particular appropriations or parts of bills appropriating money 
without having to veto the entire bill. Part IV follows with a review of 
constitutional struggles between the executive and the legislature over 
defining the state’s role in cooperative federalism programs, or programs 
initiated under federal law.  
With respect to the item veto power, New Mexico proves a useful 
window because of its extensive jurisprudence on the subject. Part III 
starts with New Mexico’s early judicial review of the power, followed by 
the development of what appears to be a jurisprudence of settled 
principles. That jurisprudence becomes more difficult to apply when the 
political clash between the branches heighten and the cases become more 
intractable for the parties to litigate and the court to resolve. 
The federal-law-based cases dealt with in Part IV brings us back to 
basic separation-of-powers principles: the struggle between the executive 
and the legislature for an upper hand at fashioning state participation in a 
joint federal-state program or a state program responding to federal law. 
 
 1. 903 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2017). See also Kathleen Gearin, The “Law of 
Ramsey County” – Reflections of a Trial Judge on State Government Gridlock, 45 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 502 (2019) (discussing Minnesota’s experience with 
legislative-executive branch disputes resulting in litigation implicating separation of powers 
and justiciability questions). 
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Part V draws conclusions about lessons to be learned from the New 
Mexico experience.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE SEVERAL 
STATES 
The modern doctrine of separation of powers is rooted in the 
writings of early political theorists. Separating governmental powers was 
championed by the likes of Locke,2 Blackstone,3 and Montesquieu,4 whose 
writings were well known in colonial America to those tasked with 
formulating new governments after breaking away from British control. 
Perhaps Madison, writing in the Federalist Papers, best described the 
purpose of the doctrine by liberally quoting from Montesquieu:  
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person or body,” says he, “there can be no liberty, because 
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate 
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.” Again: “Were the power of judging joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to 
arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. 
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with all the violence of an oppressor.”5 
Mindful of the British king’s corrupting power, the Framers of the 
Federal Constitution sought to protect against the concentration of power 
in any single institution by dividing authority among the three branches of 
the federal government—the legislative,6 the executive,7 and the judicial.8 
This practice was already in vogue as the early states created constitutions 
 
 2. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Thomas Hollis ed., 
1689). 
 3. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (9th 
ed. 1690). 
 4. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1752). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1972) (emphasis omitted). 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”). 
 7. See id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
 8. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.”). 
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in the decade following the Declaration of Independence.9 The doctrine of 
separation of powers was implicit in the constitutional grant of separate 
and distinct powers to the individual branches, as in the federal 
constitution.10 Furthermore, state constitutions supported the division with 
the addition of an express statement of separation of powers. Such a 
statement was contained in the very early Virginia Constitution of 177611 
and can now be found as a matter of course in many later state 
constitutions.12  
Whether implicit or express, there is nothing rigidly absolutist in the 
American doctrine of separation of powers. Inevitably, when the courts are 
called upon to resolve separation of powers claims, they all recognize that 
the doctrine “allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental 
function.”13 They also recognize it requires a “common sense approach” 
under which “the absolute separation of governmental functions is neither 
desirable or realistic.”14 Many of the early cases take a formalistic approach 
 
 9. JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (2018) 
(“Three states had adopted written constitutions even before Congress declared 
independence from England, because they found themselves otherwise without a 
government . . . Eleven of the thirteen states devised constitutions in 1776 or 1777.”). 
 10. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that “[f]rom this division 
on principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches 
should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the 
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.” 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926). 
 11. The structural portion of the first Virginia constitution begins: 
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and 
distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others, nor 
any person exercise the power of more than one of them at the same time; 
provided, however, administrative agencies may be created by the General 
Assembly with such authority and duties as the General Assembly may 
prescribe. Provisions may be made for judicial review of any finding, order, or 
judgment of such administrative agencies.  
VA. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 12. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1, which is markedly similar to the same 
expression in the early Virginia Constitution: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection 
of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of 
the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly directed or 
permitted.   
 13. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 32, 120 N.M. 562, 573, 904 
P.2d. 11, 22 (quoting Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113, ¶ 25, 95 N.M. 48, 53, 618 P.2d 
886, 891) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.  
4
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to the problem by deciding primarily whether the function involved is 
more legislative, executive, or judicial.15 More recent federal and state 
cases, however, take a more functional approach, focusing on the essential 
purposes served by the doctrine.16 This includes seeking to protect against 
undue “aggrandizement” of power by one branch over another, or 
“encroachment” by one branch on the essential functions of another.17  
State and federal courts often find themselves well-cautioned by 
Justice Jackson’s most famous dictum: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better 
to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate 
the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins 
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy 
but reciprocity.18 
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers19 permeates many 
areas of federal20 and state21 law and is often perceived as unnecessarily 
 
 15. See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the 
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989) (“A formalist decision uses a 
syllogistic, definitional approach to determining whether a particular exercise of power is 
legislative, executive, or judicial. It assumes that all exercises of power must fall into one of 
these categories and takes no ostensible account of the practicalities of administration in 
arriving at this determination.”). 
 16. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231 (1991). Unlike formalism, functionalism resolves such issues 
“not in terms of fixed rules but rather in light of an evolving standard designed to advance 
the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of powers.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“[T]he ‘practical 
consequences’ of locating the [Sentencing] Commission within the Judicial Branch pose[s] 
no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of 
the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or 
quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”). It has 
been suggested that California’s “core powers,” or “core functions” approach [to separation 
of powers] amounts to a middle ground. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, 
California Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U. S.F. L. REV. 655, 669 (2011) 
(“California courts have combined the elements of the formalist and functionalist models 
. . . . The core powers analysis is derived in part from relevant provisions of the California 
Constitution and partly by borrowing concepts from federal law, and the analysis has 
gradually evolved over the years to take a middle path between form and function.”). 
 18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
 19. It has been suggested that the doctrine is not limited to the constitutional context. 
See, e.g., Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers 1 (July 14, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Colorado Law School 
5
Browde: Separation of Powers in New Mexico: Item Vetoes, State Policy-Mak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO 429 
interfering with the efficient running of government.22 But as Justice 
Brandeis sagely observed, suggesting the value of inter-branch friction:  
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . . not to 
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of 
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the 
governmental powers among the three departments, to save the 
people from autocracy.23 
 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3229255 [https://perma.cc/ZPT3-AMT8] (arguing that “Congress constructs statutory 
schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative 
agencies,” and that “[l]ike its constitutional counterpart, the ‘statutory separation of powers’ 
seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability.”). 
 20. In the pre-New Deal era, the federal courts struggled with the application of the 
doctrine to presidential and congressional power over appointment and removal from 
federal offices. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) 
(upholding law limiting Presidential authority to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner 
except for causes listed in the statute); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) 
(holding Tenure of Office Act of 1867 invalid in so far as it attempted to prevent the 
president from removing executive officers). 
More recently the doctrine has been used to resolve a variety of knotty problems under 
federal law. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 492 (2010) (holding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s dual for-cause limitations on removal of 
members of the Board contravened the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine); 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (explaining that Comptroller General’s 
authority under “reporting provisions” of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act violated the Constitution’s command that Congress play no direct role in the 
execution of the laws); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–
59 (1983) (striking down a congressional one-house veto of an administrative regulation). 
 21. State courts have also struggled with similar, diverse difficulties. See, e.g., State v. 
Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 55 (explaining that 
provisions of a statute that required the Attorney General to reclassify sex offenders who 
were already classified by judges violated the separation-of-powers doctrine); State ex rel. 
Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 25, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768 (holding that the 
overhaul of New Mexico public assistance through executive action implemented a type of 
substantive policy change that was reserved to legislature and thus violated the separation of 
powers doctrine); Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1345 (Miss. 1983) 
(holding unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds seven boards and commissions 
containing legislative appointments). 
 22. One experienced practitioner in the field suggested that “much of the frustration 
and popular discontent with our governmental system is rooted in the perception that in 
modern society a system of separated powers makes it increasingly difficult to develop and 
carry out soundly conceived, coherent and effective public policy.” 38 GERALD A. 
MCDONOUGH, MASS. PRACTICE SERIES, ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE § 2:1, at n.36 (2d ed. 
2018).  
 23. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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Put less delicately by Professor Schlesinger, the framers may have 
been content to establish “‘permanent guerrilla warfare’” among the 
branches and leave resolution of the problems to the future.24 However, 
former Attorney General Edward Levi noted that the framers “did not 
envision a government in which each branch seeks out confrontation; they 
hoped the system of checks and balances would achieve a harmony of 
purposes differently fulfilled.”25 Attorney General Levi also warned that: 
Longing for simple, straight answers about the allocation of 
powers among the branches . . . , some assume that the courts 
can provide the answers . . . and can properly act as umpire 
between the other branches . . . . But . . . continuing judicial 
supervision . . . would significantly alter the balance between the 
courts and the other branches . . . [and thereby] weaken rather 
than strengthen accountability . . . [because] the Constitution, 
while it establishes a rule of law, was not intended to create a 
government by litigation.26 
This article, viewed through the lens of New Mexico’s experience, is 
focused primarily on two related areas where the “friction” is often 
palpable: the exercise of gubernatorial item veto authority,27 and the 
struggles between executive and legislative actors over the setting of state 
policy.28 Many of these judicial struggles occur in conjunction with, or as a 
result of, political clashes that arise when the governorship and legislative 
control are in the hands of opposing parties, which necessarily drags the 
court into a political fight. In this context, the courts are always mindful of 
their own doctrines of self-restraint, lest they be improperly drawn into the 
kind of interference that Attorney General Levi warned against.29 Levi also 
noted the importance of self-restraint in the political branches, stating that 
“[i]nstitutional self-restraint does not mean that we must have a 
government of hesitancy. It does mean that the duty to act is coupled with 
a duty to act with care and comity and with a sense of the higher values we 
all cherish.”30 Our task, then, is to explore whether, or to what extent, the 
political branches “act with care and comity” 31 when clashes of separation 
 
 24. Arthur Schlesinger, First Lecture, in CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR 
ROLES IN MODERN TIMES 3 (Arthur Schlesinger & Alfred De Grazia eds., 1967). 
 25. Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 
371, 391 (1976). 
 26. Id. at 386–87. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. See Levi, supra note 25, at 386–87, 391.  
 30. Id. at 391.  
 31. Id.  
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of powers arise, and the scope of the proper role of the courts when faced 
with the task of resolution. 
III. ITEM VETO AND THE NEW MEXICO EXPERIENCE 
 A. Background 
The item veto is the power granted to governors to check legislative 
spending by eliminating items in appropriation bills without vetoing the 
entire bill.32 It became a popular state constitutional idea in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as state constitution-makers were 
confronting the perceived need to impose greater control of legislative 
excesses, including budgetary excesses.33 The idea of item veto garnered 
great support from those early periods onward. Today, more than forty 
state constitutions include such provisions alongside the traditional 
gubernatorial veto authority,34 although the specific language and effect 
may differ from state to state.35  
 
 32. No such executive power exists in the Federal Constitution, but Congress sought 
to create presidential item veto authority by enacting of the Line Item Veto Act in 1996. 
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691–692, Pub. L. No. 104-130 (1996) (omitted 2005). After President 
Clinton exercised authority under that Act to cancel three provisions of law, the Supreme 
Court struck it down in Clinton v. City of New York. 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998). The 
Court held that the Act violated the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7 because it 
would have authorized the President to create a law, the text of which was not voted on by 
either House or presented to the President for signature. Id. 
 33. For a brief explanation of the historic origins of the item veto authority, and 
whether it has served its initial purpose or created a political battleground between warring 
legislative and executive powers, see Stephen Masciocchi, Comment, The Item Veto 
Power in Washington, 64 WASH. L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1989). Given its historic purpose of 
checking legislative budgetary excesses, it is not surprising that the first American use of the 
line-item veto device is found in the Provisional Constitution of the Confederacy at the 
outbreak of the Civil War. Id. at 892.  
 34. Many veto authority provisions which contain the item veto are found in the 
legislative article of the relevant state constitution. This fosters the view that “when the 
Governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a quasi-legislative function.” 
State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 62 N.M. 227, 236, 308 P.2d 205, 211 
(N.M. 1957). Even states that place the veto authority provision in the executive article, 
however, recognize that “[t]he placement of this limited legislative capability in the 
executive is an exception to the separation of powers,” and therefore, “‘the language 
conferring it must be strictly construed.’” Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 
1383 (Colo. 1985) (citing Strong v. People ex rel. Curran, 220 P. 999, 1002–03 (Colo. 
1923) (emphasis added)).  
 35. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 
1175–76 (1993): 
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The Colorado Supreme Court has explained the item veto’s 
importance in the context of modern state legislation, where all bills (other 
than general appropriation bills), must encompass a single subject,36 
thereby preventing “abuses such as log rolling . . . , riders . . . , and 
omnibus appropriation bills.”37 The item veto prevents similar abuses with 
respect to the general appropriation bill and helps to assure a balanced 
budget without requiring all-or-nothing choices by the governor in 
considering the general appropriation bill.38  
The New Mexico item veto provision, the focus of this article, was 
first proposed in an earlier constitutional iteration. Prior to statehood, the 
item veto provision was located in the Executive Article, and it provided 
gubernatorial power to disapprove a single part, or parts, of any bill 
appropriating money.39 The current New Mexico item veto provision is 
located in the Legislative Article of the state constitution, which was 
adopted in 1911. It provides that “[t]he governor may . . . approve or 
disapprove any part or parts, item or items, of any bill appropriating 
money, and . . . such [parts or items] disapproved shall be void unless 
passed over his veto.”40 New Mexico is among the states with broad item 
 
Forty-three states provide for the item veto, including every state admitted 
to the Union since the Civil War and every state but one west of the 
Mississippi. In forty-two of those states, the item veto is limited to bills 
making appropriations . . . . At least ten states allow governors to reduce as 
well as disapprove items. Many states permit governors to veto general 
legislation that the legislature has incorporated in an appropriations bill, 
although other states limit the item veto to monetary items. 
For a more current listing of those differences, showing the operative language in the 
constitutions of the states that provide for item vetoes, see the Table of State Item Veto 
Provisions, infra Appendix A [https://perma.cc/NN7K-UM9K]. 
 36. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (“[N]o bill embracing more than one subject 
shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision 
of the laws . . . .”). 
 37. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1383 (citations omitted). 
 38. Id.; see also Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 416 (N.J. 1984) (“The constitutional 
line-item veto power serves the governmental need to have a balanced budget in place at 
the start of the fiscal year. . . . It reflects a realistic appreciation of the fiscal and operational 
exigencies that attend the striking of the state’s budget.”); Opinion of the Justices to the 
House of Representatives, 428 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Mass. 1981) (“[I]f through the 
appropriation process, the Legislature were able to compel the Governor either to accept 
general legislation or to risk forfeiture of appropriations for a department of government, 
the careful balance of powers struck in [the state constitution] would be destroyed, and the 
fundamental principle of separation of powers . . . would be substantially undermined.”). 
 39. See N.M. CONST. of 1889, art. V, § 7. 
 40. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 22. The constitutional convention of 1910, which 
adopted the current constitution, considered a different item veto provision which may 
9
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veto provisions, given that it “increased the partial veto power to parts of 
bills of general legislation which contained incidental items of 
appropriation.”41 It also allows veto of non-monetary provisions and 
appropriation bills beyond a general annual appropriations act.42 
B. The Initial Interpretive Rulings of the New Mexico Supreme Court43 
In earlier cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court found the 
application of the item veto provision fairly easy to resolve. In addition to 
making clear that the proviso applies beyond general appropriation bills to 
“‘any bill appropriating money,’”44 the early opinions established that the 
item veto is a power that may not be exercised with respect to non-
appropriation bills.45 The early New Mexico decisions also established that 
the state constitution allows appropriation bills to describe how amounts 
appropriated are to be expended.46 Furthermore, the constitutional 
language extends beyond “item or items” of appropriation to include “part 
 
have limited the partial veto to “items of appropriation,” but it was rejected in favor of the 
current version. See State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 18, 62 N.M 227, 
235, 308 P.2d 205, 210. 
 41. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010 at ¶ 18, 62 N.M at 235, 308 P.2d at 210 (quoting Brief of 
Amici Curiae, Irwin S. Moise and Lewis R. Sutin).  
 42. Id. The New Mexico General Appropriation Act (“GAA”) for the next fiscal year 
is introduced in the House of Representatives early in each session and contains the 
specific appropriations for most of the general operation of state government, listing the 
items and amounts of appropriation by sources of the funds. An example of the opening 
pages of a recent GAA including the page showing the appropriation for the Legislative 
Branch, (chosen only because it is short) is contained in Appendix B, see infra Appendix B 
[https://perma.cc/A95M-E7CF]. 
 43. Most of the relevant appellate rulings in New Mexico are from the New Mexico 
Supreme Court because such cases are generally brought as mandamus actions under the 
court’s original jurisdiction. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The New Mexico high court has 
legitimated that practice as “a proper vehicle by which to test the constitutionality of vetoes 
or attempted vetoes by the Governor.” State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 
¶ 6, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979. The New Mexico practice is consistent with that 
of many other jurisdictions. See State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973); 
Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940); Fulmore v. Lane, 140 S.W. 405 (1911).  
 44. Saiz, 1983-NMSC-010, ¶ 14, 62 N.M. at 233, 308 P.2d at 209.  
 45. Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 1983-NMSC-081, ¶ 6, 100 N.M. 342, 670 
P.2d 953 (“[B]ecause the Act does not appropriate money, we hold that the Governor’s 
veto power was invalidly exercised in violation of Article IV, Section 22.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 46. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, ¶ 18, 69 N.M. 430, 
436, 367 P.2d 925, 929–30. Indeed, the New Mexico Constitution requires that “[e]very 
law making an appropriation shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to 
which it is to be applied.” N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (emphasis added). 
10
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or parts” of such bills, thereby allowing for a partial veto of such non-
financial provisions.47 A series of later opinions, including cases that dealt 
with item vetoes of provisions in the General Appropriation Act (discussed 
in a later subsection), as well as the cases discussed in the subsection that 
follows, deserve more careful attention. 
C. New Mexico’s Modern Item Veto Cases and Enhanced Judicial 
Involvement 
1. The Sego and Coll Opinions. 
State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick48 ushered in a more nuanced and 
complicated analysis with respect to the governor’s veto authority. 
Specifically, Sego v. Kirkpatrick recognized that the governor has a 
broader authority to veto parts beyond the mere item of appropriation.49 
Critically, however, the Sego court also recognized that the broad 
gubernatorial authority to veto parts beyond items of appropriation “does 
not mean there are no limitations on the partial veto of bills appropriating 
money.”50 The Sego court declared that such a limitation necessarily 
derived from the principle of “checks and balances” underlying our system 
of government: 
The power of veto, like all powers constitutionally conferred 
upon a governmental officer or agency, is not absolute and may 
not be exercised without any restraint or limitation whatsoever. 
The very concept of such absolute and unrestrained power is 
inconsistent with the concept of “checks and balances,” which is 
basic to the form and structure of State government created by 
the people of New Mexico in their constitution, and is 
inconsistent with the fundamental principle that under our 
system of government no man is completely above the law.51 
 
 47. See State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶17, 86 N.M. 359, 365, 
524 P.2d 974, 981: 
[T]he purpose or purposes for the inclusion of the terms “part or parts,” “item 
or items” and “parts or items” in our Constitution were to extend or enlarge 
the partial veto power thereby conferred beyond the partial veto power 
conferred by the constitutions of other states wherein that power is limited to 
(1) items of appropriation, and (2) to general appropriation bills. 
 48. 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M 359, 524 P.2d 975. 
 49. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 86 N.M. at 364–65, 524 P.2d at 980–81. 
 50. Id. ¶ 17, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.  
 51. Id. ¶ 5, 86 N.M. at 362, 524 P.2d at 978 (citing Jenkins v. Knight, 293 P.2d 6 
(Cal. 1956)).  
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Against this backdrop, the Sego court articulated two principles that 
should govern the evaluation of separation-of-powers challenges to the 
exercise of the gubernatorial item veto. The first principle established that 
the gubernatorial item veto should not be exercised in such a way as to 
create legislation: 
The power of partial veto is . . . a negative power . . . , and is not 
a positive power . . . . Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised 
that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and 
does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create 
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature . . . .52 
The second principle established that: 
The Legislature may not properly abridge [the item veto] power 
by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon 
appropriations, and the Governor may not properly distort 
legislative appropriations or arrogate unto himself the power of 
making appropriations by carefully striking words, phrases or 
sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.53 
The court expanded upon the second Sego principle in State ex rel. 
Coll v. Carruthers,54 with particular reference to item vetoes in general 
appropriation acts. The court explained that a separation of powers line is 
crossed when the legislature attaches conditions to general appropriation 
bills that reserves to itself “‘powers of close supervision that are essentially 
executive in character.’”55 While the legislature may impose restrictions on 
appropriated funds, such restrictions must be limited to matters of 
“‘significant financial impact,’” as distinguished from “detailed, miniscule, 
inconsequential executive management decisions.”56 Thus, the legislature 
may impose “a condition precedent to the expenditure of appropriated 
funds,” as distinguished from a provision that deals with “the details of 
managing the expenditure once approval is granted.”57 
 
 52. Id. ¶ 18, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.  
 53. Id. ¶ 12, 86 N.M. at 364, 524 P.2d at 980. For an interesting extension of 
legislative drafting that would be a gross violation of this Sego principle, see Nicholas 
Passarello, Note, The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations Bundling in Alaska, 30 
ALASKA L. REV. 125, 125 (2013) (dealing with a draft of an appropriation bill, later 
withdrawn, that would have included a line in its appropriation bill that if any single 
appropriation were line-item vetoed the entire bill would be void). 
 54. 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 7, 107 N.M. 439, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383. 
 55. Id. ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384 (quoting Anderson v. Lamm, 579 
P.2d 620, 624 (1978)).  
 56. Id. ¶ 11, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384. 
 57. Id. ¶ 18, 107 N.M. at 444, 759 P.2d at 1385. The Coll court also admonished the 
legislature that conditions on appropriations which attempt to “enact [a] policy” are “not 
suitable for inclusion in the general appropriation bill” because that bill “‘shall embrace 
12
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Most importantly, the Coll court made two other principles clear. 
First, cases of this nature involve a delicate constitutional balance, and 
therefore the court must strive to “leave intact the basic legislative oversight 
and appropriation function while assuring the executive a reasonable 
degree of freedom and discretion over the expenditure of appropriated 
funds.”58 Second, judicial evaluation of such challenges requires that “our 
subjective evaluation of the facts underlies the principles and tests we 
espouse and rely upon.”59 
Thus, Sego established the basic principles guiding judicial review of 
item vetoes in New Mexico: the governor has a role to play in the 
legislative process through his item veto authority. This role is limited and 
“negative” in nature. Therefore, the court must oversee both the improper 
aggrandizement of gubernatorial power and improper legislative drafting 
attempts that encroach upon the proper exercise of gubernatorial 
executive-management powers.60 Coll expanded on these principles by 
adding a more specific guideline for separation-of-powers inquiries when a 
challenge involves the item veto of legislative language in relation to a 
particular appropriation in an appropriations act.61 
Such formulations may be difficult for the court to apply, in light of 
the Coll court’s assertion that improperly imposed legislative conditions 
are separate “items” for purposes of the item veto power, and therefore, a 
veto of those items does not require the money to which the condition is 
attached also to be stricken.62 This latter assertion gives rise to the negative 
implication—that a properly imposed legislative condition may not be 
stricken unless the appropriation conditioned also is stricken.63 This is 
perhaps out of fear that it might otherwise create new positive legislation in 
violation of the Sego principle that the item veto power is only a negative 
“power to disapprove.”64  
In any event, the obligation of a careful and detailed judicial review 
stems from the court’s view of its traditional role at the core of the 
 
nothing but appropriation,’” and such matters are “better addressed by general legislation.” 
Id. ¶ 13, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384 (citing N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16; State ex rel. 
Delgado v. Sargent, 1913-NMSC-054, ¶ 14, 18 N.M. 131, 134 P. 218, 219).  
 58. Id. ¶ 24, 107 N.M. at 446, 759 P.2d at 1387. 
 59. Id. ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384.  
 60. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 17–18, 86 N.M. 359, 365, 
524 P.2d 975, 981. 
 61. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶¶ 24, 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 446, 759 P.2d at 1387, 
1384. 
 62. Id. ¶ 22, 107 N.M. at 445, 759 P.2d at 1386. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Sego, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981. 
13
Browde: Separation of Powers in New Mexico: Item Vetoes, State Policy-Mak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO 437 
constitutional order to oversee the balance of powers between the 
executive and the legislature.65 That task must be performed even though, 
as required here, the court must engage in a “subjective evaluation of the 
facts” underlying the principles being applied.66 In applying the principles 
of Sego and Coll, the court binds itself to a highly functional approach to 
the resolution of item veto challenges. Such difficulties are no different 
from those encountered by the U.S. Supreme Court in applying a 
functional approach to difficult separation-of-powers principles at the 
federal level.67 
Given the special nature of the governor’s item veto power under 
state constitutions, a reviewing court taking the New Mexico approach may 
not be able to resort to the formalistic analysis employed by the federal 
courts. Under this analysis, federal courts often deem a particular function 
as essentially “executive,” “legislative,” or “judicial,” and then merely allow 
the labeling to determine the result.68 With respect to the exercise of the 
item veto power, however, governors exercise a kind of constitutionally 
authorized, albeit limited, legislative authority.69 Thus, the easy resort to 
 
 65. See State ex rel. Los Ranchos v. City of Albuquerque, 1994-NMSC-126, ¶ 15, 
119 N.M. 150, 156, 889 P.2d 185, 191 (“The reviewability of executive and legislative acts 
is implicit and inherent in the common law and in the division of powers between the three 
branches of government.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–79 (1803) (“It is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”).  
 66. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384. 
 67. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397 (1989) (finding that although the 
service of Article III judges on the Federal Sentencing Commission was “somewhat 
troublesome,” the Court was able to uphold that practice against a separation of powers 
challenge). The Mistretta Court also noted that “[t]he ultimate inquiry remains whether a 
particular extrajudicial assignment undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch,” and 
stated that “we cannot see how the service of federal judges on the Commission will have a 
constitutionally significant practical effect on the operation of the Judicial Branch.” Id. at 
404, 406.  
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court was confronted with the difficult question of 
whether the appointment system for the independent counsel, who was authorized to 
investigate and prosecute high-ranking government officials under the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978 (since expired), violated separation of powers by circumscribing 
Presidential supervision and removal authority. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Taking a pragmatic 
approach, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the President’s “need to control” the 
Independent Counsel was not “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to 
require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the 
President.” Id. at 691–92. 
 68. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1986) (“[B]ecause Congress has 
retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with 
executive powers.”). 
 69. See State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 62 N.M. 227, 236, 308 
P.2d 205, 211 (“[W]hen the Governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a 
14
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formalism is not an option in item veto cases because both the governor 
and the legislature are acting in a legislative capacity. Rather, the court 
must apply its best judgment to determine whether—through the exercise 
of that power—the governor “arrogate[s] unto himself the power of making 
appropriations,” or whether the legislature “abridges” its constitutional 
authority by subtly drafting “conditions, limitations or restrictions upon 
appropriations.”70 
To say that the boundaries between the two are less than clear is to 
state the obvious. The lack of clarity regarding what the court might 
conclude in its “subjective evaluation of the facts” in any given challenge to 
a gubernatorial item veto after a Sego/Coll review could result in two 
different, but perhaps equally salutary, results.  
On one level, ambiguity could serve an important instrumental value. 
If the political branches were to take a page from the federal framers, they 
would understand that “a mere demarcation on parchment of the 
constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard 
against [inter-branch] encroachments.”71 Rather, it is through the “interior 
structure of the government . . . that its several constituent parts may, by 
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places.”72 Or, put more succinctly by two modern constitutional scholars 
contemplating similar federal constitutional ambiguities, “[t]hese 
conflict-producing ambiguities may themselves have contributed to 
furthering the Framers’ purposes of combating excessive concentrations of 
power.”73 It might therefore be hoped that uncertainty of judicial 
resolution will lead the warring factions to find ways to avoid this 
confrontation, which would require courts to denominate one side the 
winner and the other the loser—a result which ill serves the political system 
and limits the number of item veto cases which might otherwise be 
brought. 
On another level, the principles established by the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in the Sego/Coll decisions (which essentially establish 
 
quasi-legislative function.”) (citing Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 109 P. 316 
(Wash. 1910)).  
 70. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 
P.2d 975, 980 (N.M. 1974).  
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 at 347 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1972). 
 72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 355 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1982) (emphasis added). 
 73. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343 
(15th ed. 2001).  
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instructions to both branches) might provide sufficient guidance to the 
parties and lessen the need for litigation over these disputes.74  
Due to politics, however—and especially in an era of such divided 
government—neither suggestion seems to have had an effect. Rather, the 
item veto battles have continued in New Mexico, as we see in the cases 
that follow. This requires the courts to either resolve such cases or find 
useful means of restraint that may, on occasion, also lead to resolution.  
2. The Post-Sego/Coll Cases 
In State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez,75 the New Mexico Supreme Court 
faced an attempt by the governor to reduce an item of appropriation. The 
governor, relying on the assertion in Coll that “‘New Mexico . . . allows the 
broadest possible veto authority by additionally providing authority to veto 
“parts,” not only “items,”’”76 argued that striking the “1” from the $150,000 
appropriation for the benefit of the mortgage finance authority was 
consistent with that principle. She asserted that Coll conferred the power 
“‘to veto something smaller and more discrete than “items,”’” and that 
“‘[o]ne hundred thousand is a “part” of $150,000.00.’”77 The court 
rejected this argument, however, holding that “[t]he Governor’s partial 
veto that would allow scaling of appropriations is invalid and 
unconstitutional” and violates the separation of powers doctrine.78 
The Smith court began its analysis by noting that existing “partial veto 
decisions do not answer the question raised in this case,” but that 
“principles about the line-item veto” found in other cases could assist in 
finding a resolution.79 The court first turned to Coll, which recognized the 
limit to the item veto power: the “‘power of partial veto is only a negative 
power to disapprove; it is not the power to enact or create new legislation 
 
 74. Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 12, 86 N.M at 364, 524 P.2d at 980 (including the 
instruction that the legislature must not abridge the item veto power by “subtle drafting of 
conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations,” and the correlative instruction 
that the governor must refrain from distorting “legislative appropriations or arrogat[ing] 
unto himself [or herself] the power of making appropriations by carefully striking words, 
phrases or sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.”). Id.  
 75. 2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276.  
 76. Id. ¶ 5, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277 (citing State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 
1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 8, 107 N.M. 439, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383). 
 77. Id. ¶ 5, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277 (alteration in original).  
 78. Id. ¶ 10, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278. As is sometimes done in original 
matters deemed to require expedited relief, the court in this case ruled from the bench 
after oral argument, with a later issued Opinion “to further explain the order of [the] 
Court.” Id. ¶ 2, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1276–77. 
 79. Id. ¶ 6, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277. 
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by selective deletions.’”80 The court then coupled this limitation with 
Sego’s requirement “that [the veto] eliminate[s] or destroy[s] the whole of 
an item or part” and prohibits “the striking of individual words that results 
in legislation inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent.”81 On these 
grounds, the court ruled that the striking of the single numeric digit “did 
not eliminate the whole of the item,” but instead “distorted the 
Legislature’s intent to appropriate $150,000.”82 The court thereby added 
the following definitive principle to the item veto consideration: “[t]here is 
no authority to scale back: the governor may strike the whole of the 
appropriation or leave it intact; she may not conceive her own 
appropriation.”83  
Shortly after Smith was decided, the court confronted a different 
problem resulting from a 2011 bill that amended five sections of the 
Unemployment Compensation Law in State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez.84 
The bill sought to address impending insolvency in the unemployment 
compensation fund by reducing benefits to the unemployed and increasing 
employer contributions beyond the contribution amount paid in 2011.85 
The governor exercised a partial veto and struck one of the variables in a 
section of the bill that was necessary to calculate employer contributions 
beginning in January 2012.86 The heart of the problem was described by 
the court as follows: 
[T]he Governor’s veto, perhaps inadvertently, left a void, as 
there is no Contribution Schedule for 2012. Without a 
Contribution Schedule in 2012, there is no basis with which to 
determine employer contributions to the unemployment fund 
by established employers for calendar year 2012. These 
employers have effectively been exempted from what has been a 
mandatory contribution requirement since the Act’s inception.87 
 
 80. Id. ¶ 8, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278 (quoting Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶ 6, 
107 N.M. at 442, 759 P.2d at 1383) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M 
359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981) (emphasis in original).  
 82. Id. ¶ 8, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278. 
 83. Id.  
 84. 2011-NMSC-045, ¶ 1, 270 P.3d 96, 97. The Stewart court initially refused to rule 
on the merits because a special session of the legislature had been called, and the Governor 
expressed her intent to include this statutory dispute on the agenda of that session. Id. ¶ 8, 
270 P.3d at 99. 
 85. Id. ¶ 1, 270 P.3d at 97. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. ¶ 7, 270 P.3d at 99 (citations omitted).  
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Once again, the court returned to the principles articulated in Sego 
and Coll to conclude that the partial item veto was invalid. The court 
began with the dual policing role it accepted in Sego: (1) to protect the 
governor against legislative abridgement of the item veto power “‘by subtle 
drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations;’” 
and (2) to shield the legislature from an exercise of the item veto to “create 
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the legislature, by the careful 
striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences.”88 The court made it clear 
that the issue in this case presented the latter problem of “whether the 
Governor’s partial veto of House Bill 59 destroyed the whole of the item 
or part, leaving a workable piece of legislation without creating legislation 
that is inconsistent with the Act.”89 
In deciding that question, the Stewart court turned to State ex rel. 
Dickson v. Saiz90 for the proposition that “[a]ll language that relates to the 
subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for the veto to be 
valid. In addition, the remaining legislation must continue to be a 
 
 88. Id. ¶ 11, 270 P.3d at 100 (quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-
059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 P.2d 975, 980). 
 89. Id. ¶ 11, 270 P.3d at 100. The court acknowledged that the case also raised a 
serious question whether the bill is one “appropriate[ing] money,” a constitutional 
prerequisite for the application of the item veto. Finding the issue involving “the whole of 
an item or part” to be both “dispositive and perhaps less complex,” the court noted that 
“for the purposes of this Opinion, we assume, without deciding that . . . [the bill] is a bill 
appropriating funds.” Id. ¶ 12, 270 P.3d at 100. 
Though the court in Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 1983-NMSC-081, ¶ 6, 100 N.M. 
342 344, 670 P.2d 953, 955, found it easy to resolve the “bill appropriating money” 
question, the Stewart court correctly noted that is not often the case. 2011-NMSC-045 at ¶ 
12, 270 P.3d at 100. For example, in a very complex bill dealing with a number of statutory 
changes involving public safety passed by the New Mexico Legislature during the 2018 
regular session, the governor used the line item veto to eliminate substantive portions of the 
bill, even though there was no direct appropriation in the act. See H.B. 19, 53d Leg., 2d 
Sess. (N.M. 2018); N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, H. EXEC. MESSAGE NO. 148 (Mar. 7, 
2018). At best, there may have been some reference in the bill to either past or future 
appropriations, yet the governor claimed she was acting under Art. IV, § 22. The bill and 
the Executive Message can be found at 
www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=19&year=18 
[https://perma.cc/TV9X-3D3S]. Other courts have made clear that transfers of previously 
appropriated money may be subject to the item-veto authority of the governor. See, e.g., 
Wielechowski v. State, 403 P.3d 1141, 1153 (Alaska 2017); Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 
20, 25–30 (Ariz. 1992). On the other hand, it has been held that bills authorizing the 
issuing of bonds are creations of debt and are not appropriations subject to the line-item 
veto power. Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (Miss. 1995). 
 90. 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 28–32, 62 N.M. 227, 237–238, 308 P.2d 205, 211–212 (per 
curiam separate opinion denying motion for rehearing) (upholding the governor’s use of a 
partial veto when all sections related to that purpose were vetoed). 
18
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workable piece of legislation.”91 In Stewart, then, it was clear to the court 
that: 
The Governor’s veto eliminate[d] established employers’ 
contributions for 2012 by making it impossible to determine the 
2012 employer contribution rate. By only deleting certain 
language, the setting of the 2012 Contribution Schedule to 
Schedule 3, and leaving other phrases relating to the same 
subject matter intact, . . . the Governor’s veto impermissibly left 
an incomplete and unworkable Act.92 
The court therefore concluded that “the partial veto to House Bill 59 
is constitutionally invalid.”93 The Stewart court also explained that the item 
veto could have been constitutionally applied by “completely delet[ing] all 
the provisions in House Bill 59 that would have addressed the concerns 
described in the Governor’s veto message,”94 but because the item veto did 
not do so, it was invalid. Thus, the lessons from Smith and Stewart are 
clear—when the governor’s objection is to a “part” or “item,” it is the whole 
part or item that must go, as well as any other part or item so related to the 
offensive part which, if left standing, would lead to an “incomplete and 
unworkable Act.” 
That leaves open the question of whether two similar items of 
appropriation in a single general appropriation act require the veto of both 
to accomplish an appropriate item veto. The court considered this issue in 
State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez95 when confronted with two separate 
judicial pay increases in the same act: 
The first increase, funded in Section 4(B) of the Appropriations 
Act, was a 5% raise, the appropriation for which was lumped in 
with various other appropriations to the judicial branch to pay 
the salaries of all judicial employees, including judges. . . .96 
 
 The second increase, separately funded in Section 8(A) of 
the Appropriations Act, was the same 3% raise authorized for all 
eligible state employees, including judges. Section 8(A)(2) in 
particular allocated $579,937 to fund the 3% raise for judges 
and increased the salary of a Supreme Court Justice to 
$134,922, a sum that included both the 5% and the 3% raises.97 
 
 91. Stewart, 2011-NMSC-045 at ¶ 15, 270 P.3d at 101. 
 92. Id. ¶ 22, 270 P.3d at 103. 
 93. Id. ¶ 24, 270 P.3d at 103. 
 94. Id. ¶ 21, 270 P.3d at 103. 
 95. 2015-NMSC-001, 340 P.3d 597. 
 96. Id. ¶ 1, 340 P.3d at 598 (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. ¶ 2, 340 P.3d at 598 (citation omitted). 
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The governor exercised the line-item veto authority to strike the 
language of section 8(A)(2), cancelling the application of the three percent 
raise, but did not touch the language of section 4(B) dealing with the five 
percent raise.98 The petitioners, including lower court judges and their 
associations,99 challenged the veto of the three percent raise, thereby 
seeking the full eight percent pay raise or, in the alternative, at least 
preserving the five percent raise.100 The governor sought to maintain the 
veto of the three percent raise and also claimed that since the veto of 
section 8(A)(2) included the lump sum salary figure for supreme court 
justices ($134,922) which encompassed  “the total sum of both 
appropriations,” the veto of the three percent raise effectuated the removal 
of the entire eight percent raise.101  
The court, in a per curium opinion, held “the Governor’s veto was 
effective with respect to the 3% raise set forth in Section 8(A)(2).”102 The 
court, however, also ruled that the five percent raise separately funded in 
section 4(B) of the Appropriations Act was never vetoed and therefore 
survived intact.103 In so doing, the court struggled over whether, or to what 
extent, it was bound by, or was abandoning its earlier declarations relating 
to the necessity that connected vetoes stand or fall together. 
The Cisneros court’s analysis began with the re-articulation of two 
settled principles from prior cases—that the item veto is “‘not a positive 
power’” but only a “‘negative power, or a power to delete or destroy;’”104 
and that it must “‘destroy[] the whole of an item or part [without] 
distort[ing] the legislative intent.’”105 The court then made an unexpected 
 
 98. See id. ¶ 3, 340 P.3d at 598–99. 
 99. The bill also affected sitting supreme court members, four of whom recused 
themselves. Id. ¶ 5, 340 P.3d at 599. However, under the so-called “rule of necessity,” the 
remaining sitting Justice, Richard Bosson, (who did not recuse, but was not standing for 
retention in the coming election) was appointed Chief, with the power to preside and 
appoint a quartet of retired jurists to sit pro tempore to decide the case. Id. 
 100. Id. ¶ 4, 340 P.3d at 599. 
 101. Id. ¶ 24, 340 P.3d at 604.  “The Governor took the position that regardless of 
what the Legislature’s original intent may have been to make two separate appropriations, 
that intention changed or evolved as the Appropriations Act took final form.”  Id. 
 102. Id. ¶ 6, 340 P.3d at 599. 
 103. Id. This was another case in which the court ruled from the bench, with this later 
opinion setting forth its “reasoning in more detail.” Id.; see, e.g., State ex rel. Coll v. 
Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.3d 1380, 1383. 
 104. 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 
1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M 359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981). 
 105. 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (citing Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 18, 
86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981; State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-043, ¶ 8, 
150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276, 1278) (alterations in original). 
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shift from its traditional item veto analysis, contending that “[t]hese broad 
principles provide only the starting point of our analysis [because] each 
situation has come down to the particular facts of a particular 
appropriation and a particular veto.”106 The opinion mis-cites the Sego 
decision for this proposition,107 which says nothing about the “fact-bound” 
nature of the inquiry or its importance.  The Coll decision does, but only 
in reference to the need for the court to engage in a “subjective evaluation 
of the facts” in striking the balance between legislative and executive 
authority through the application of the Sego/Coll principles.108  
Nonetheless, this refocus allowed the Cisneros per curium to 
construct its search for legislative intent with respect to judicial salaries as a 
“factual” matter—whether the legislature intended a combined eight 
percent raise or two separate raises of three percent and five percent.109 
Finding some ambiguity on that question in the words of the statute, the 
court relied on the “‘structure of the statute.’”110 Namely, the court noted 
“the Legislature’s own choice to fund these raises through two separate 
appropriations, contained in two separate sections of the Appropriations 
Act, and made to two separate branches of government—5% to the 
Judiciary and 3% to [Department of Finance and Administration].”111 Once 
that “factual” issue was resolved, it was easy for the court to conclude that 
“the Legislature intended two separate raises . . . one of which the 
Governor vetoed, the other of which remained intact.”112 
The court found that “the Legislature intended the money allocated 
in Section 8(A)(2) to fund the same 3% raise for judges that was given to 
other state employees in Section 8(A) . . . . [and] . . . the Governor’s veto 
removed from the Appropriations Act every trace of the 3% raise for 
judges.”113 This led inexorably to the conclusion that “[e]verything related 
to the 3% raise for judges was confined to Section 8(A)(2), which the 
Governor vetoed in its entirety.”114 
The court recognized, however, that the “closer question is whether 
the veto of Section 8(A)(2) had any effect on the 5% raise funded in 
 
 106. Id. ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (emphasis added). 
 107. Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 11, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.  
 108. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384. 
 109. Cisneros, 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23–26, 340 P.3d at 603–04. 
 110. Id. ¶ 25, 340 P.3d at 604 (citing State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 15, 316 
P.3d 183, 186). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. ¶ 27, 340 P.3d at 604. 
 114. Id.  
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Section 4(B).”115 This is especially clear given the governor’s argument that 
“the money appropriated in Section 4(B) to fund the 5% raise cannot be 
used for its intended purpose because her veto eliminated all of the 
‘language’ in the Appropriations Act related to a judicial salary increase.”116 
The governor cited language in Stewart to suggest that her argument met 
the requirement.117 The court rejected the governor’s argument, however, 
claiming it “overlooks the distinct facts of this case,” whereby section 4(B) 
“gave judges a 5% raise through [an] appropriation[]. . . without any ‘pay 
raise language’ to veto but the appropriations themselves.”118 The court 
concluded that “the general rule articulated in Stewart that ‘[a]ll language 
that relates to the subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for 
the veto to be valid’ simply does not apply.”119 
The court was then confronted with the governor’s further argument 
that “if the veto of Section 8(A)(2) did not also eliminate the 5% raise in 
Section 4(B), the entire appropriation in Section 4(B) ‘is improper and 
should be stricken’ due to ‘careful drafting of legislation’ aimed at 
‘circumvent[ing] or preempt[ing] the Governor’s veto power,’” as 
established in Sego.120 This time, rather than suggesting that the specific 
facts overrode the Sego dictum, the court contended it was not until Coll 
that the court was confronted with applying the Sego limitation on 
legislative drafting.121 This remains the only instance in which the court has 
“rejected a challenge to a partial veto based . . . on a refusal to validate 
‘artful drafting’ by the Legislature.”122  
Rather than making any factual distinction from the application in 
Coll, the court determined the “Legislature imposed no condition . . . 
upon its appropriations for judicial pay raises” in its two “stand-alone, 
unconditional, and separate appropriations [that] must be vetoed in their 
entirety like any other appropriation of which the Governor disapproves in 
whole or in part.”123 The court, therefore, rejected the governor’s invitation 
“to interpret the notion of ‘subtle drafting’ to fit the circumstances of this 
case” because to do so would not provide any “limiting principle to 
 
 115. Id. ¶ 28, 340 P.3d at 604.  
 116. Id. ¶ 354, 340 P.3d at 606.  
 117. Id. ¶ 34–35, 340 P.3d at 606. 
 118. Id. ¶ 35, 340 P.3d at 606. 
 119. Id. (citing State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-045, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 96, 
101). 
 120. Id. ¶ 37, 340 P.3d at 607 (alterations in original); see State ex rel. Sego v. 
Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M 359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981. 
 121. Cisneros, 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 38, 340 P.3d at 607.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. ¶ 39, 340 P.3d at 607. 
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distinguish subtle drafting from drafting that is not so subtle.”124 The court 
clarified that “[o]utside of the facts of Coll . . . we . . . prefer to allow the 
legislative process to play out free from judicial interference.”125 The court 
thereby expressed a kind of deference to the political process not 
previously found in the item veto cases, and undermined the Coll decision 
in the process. 
Understanding that it had done some violence to the important 
principles of Sego and Coll, the court concluded with a veiled mea culpa,126 
suggesting it could not “find any legal basis to conclude” the existence of 
legislative overreach, particularly “when the Governor had notice of the 
Legislature’s intent and when she had other tools in the political process at 
her disposal.”127 Besides, the court continued, this case had arisen in an 
“unusual context . . . unlike any of our precedents.”128 
Thus, the post-Sego/Coll cases provided useful application of the 
previously established principles that governed item veto litigation, until 
Cisneros and its per curium effort to resolve the dispute over dual judicial 
raises in the 2014 General Appropriation Act. In upholding one of the 
raises and allowing the item veto of the other, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court came to a reasonable compromise. However, it did so in a way that 
may allow future cases to avoid application of the Sego/Coll principles 
when confronted with an “unusual circumstance” or where it can be 
suggested that the governor has “other tools in the political process at [his 
or] her disposal. 
D. The Inevitable Invitation for Judicial Restraint 
Despite the steady stream of item veto cases in New Mexico, 
especially during recent periods of politically-divided government,129 the 
New Mexico Supreme Court also has recognized that judicial activism in 
 
 124. Id. ¶ 42, 340 P.3d at 608 (citing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-
NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53, 75). 
 125. Id.  
 126. See id. ¶ 46, 340 P.3d at 609. 
 127. Id. (emphasis added.) The court detailed numerous opportunities, outside the 
resolution of item-veto disputes, for the governor and legislature to work together in the 
formulation of legislation—opportunities that always exist and could be used in future cases 
to prevent judicial challenges. Id. ¶¶ 12–18, 340 P.3d at 601–02. 
 128. Id. ¶ 47, 340 P.3d at 609. 
 129. It should not be surprising that during the same period of divided government, 
redistricting efforts requiring a new statute with gubernatorial consent could not be resolved 
without judicial involvement. See, e.g., Maestas v. Hall, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 45, 274 P.3d 
66, 81 (court-drawn redistricting remanded for the second time to correct, among other 
things, “the partisan performance changes and bias noted in this order . . . .”). 
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this area is not always necessary—or the best policy. Even when the issues 
may appear critically important, judicial declination to proceed may arise 
when other possible paths to resolution present themselves. Given that 
most item veto cases are brought as original mandamus actions in the New 
Mexico Supreme Court,130 the court may easily fall back on the principle to 
refuse to hear a case because the petitioner failed to demonstrate an 
absence of a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”131  
One recent example can be found in State ex. rel. Stewart v. 
Martinez,132 when the court initially refused to hear the case because the 
governor intended to include the issue for consideration in a previously 
called special session, noting: 
Because the special session took place before the effective date 
of the language vetoed by Governor Martinez, addressing the 
issue during the special session would have been a plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that was 
available to Petitioners; therefore, a writ of mandamus was not 
warranted.133 
“When no resolution was reached on the issue during the 2011 
Special Session” and “[p]etitioners asserted that their petition was ripe,” 
the New Mexico Supreme Court then took the case back for resolution on 
the merits.134 
Even more critical, however, was a case brought in 2017 that 
evidenced just how pitched the battle between the executive and the 
legislature may become. In State ex rel. the Legislative Council v. 
Martinez,135 there was a challenge to a broad exercise of the line-item veto 
of the General Appropriation Act of 2017. First, the governor exercised 
the item veto authority to strike all items dealing with the funding of the 
state legislature, stating the following justification: 
Throughout this legislative session, and others, I have heard a 
great deal of discussion about how the Legislative and Judicial 
 
 130. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-2-3 (1978) (exclusive original mandamus jurisdiction 
in the district and supreme courts); see also supra text accompanying note 43. 
 131. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-2-5 (1978) (“The writ shall not issue in any case 
where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”). 
 132. 2011-NMSC-045, 270 P.3d 96, discussed previously at supra text accompanying 
note 84. 
 133. Id. ¶ 8, 270 P.3d at 99 (citing State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 1999–NMSC–036, ¶ 
12, 128 N.M. 154, 158, 990 P.2d 1277, 1281). 
 134. Id. ¶ 9, 270 P.3d at 100. 
 135. Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition for Emergency Writ of Mandamus, State 
ex rel. The Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-326422 (N.M. May 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/V3VV-3L9F. 
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branches are separate but co-equal branches of government. 
While true, it apparently does not apply when they are 
considering reductions to their budgets. Every time the 
Legislature imposes across-the-board reductions, the Legislature 
exempts both itself and the Judiciary from the same level of 
reductions that most of our agencies face.136  
The governor’s veto message also contended that the legislature’s 
appropriations, like those for the district courts, are done in a “lump sum” 
fashion, while the executive agencies are appropriated by specific 
categories. She claimed this treatment of the legislature and the court does 
not lend itself to ensuring “accountability through the effective allocation 
of resources for the benefit of all New Mexicans,” as the Legislative 
Finance Committee’s mission statement states.137 One might question 
whether the governor’s statement in returning the bill to the House 
represents a fair expression of the principle of separation of powers with 
respect to the three equal branches of government,138 or perhaps a failure 
 
 136. The governor’s veto message does not acknowledge that the total appropriation 
for the legislature represents only 0.3 percent of the state annual budget or that the 
appropriation for the entire statewide judiciary represents only 4.5 percent of the state 
annual budget. See Verified Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus at 5, No. 
S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/B2G4-P7GB.  
 137. N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, H. Exec. MESSAGE NO. 56, at 2 (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/ExecMessages/house/HB0002GovMsg.p
df [https://perma.cc/WWW8-KUBC]. The specific comments by the governor 
demonstrate her equal displeasure with the way legislative budget proposals have also 
exempted the judiciary from across-the-board cuts, and the “lump sum” funding of district 
courts. Thus, it would have been obvious that any ruling in favor of the legislature in a 
potential law suit over this wholesale item veto implicating legislative authority might also 
have benefited the supreme court’s own budget formulation authority for the judiciary. Id. 
 138. Judicial review of item vetoes may not extend to an evaluation of the governor’s 
“statement of reasons.” As the Colorado Court has cogently explained: “[W]e are mindful 
of the fact that the governor may veto a bill for any reason he chooses . . . and this court 
will not inquire into the governor’s justifications for a veto.” Romer v. Colo. Gen. 
Assembly, 840 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Colo. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Ninetieth Minn. 
State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2017) (“We do not ‘judge the 
wisdom of a veto, or the motives behind it . . . .’”) (citations omitted). But see Cannabis 
Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 322 P.3d 1246, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 351 P.3d 
151 (Wash. 2015) (treating governor’s veto message that accompanied his line-item veto as 
legislative intent because governor is acting in legislative capacity when approving or 
disapproving legislation). 
The Romer court went on to hold that where the state constitution requires that that 
bill be filed “with his objections,” a mere statement of the governor’s disapproval is not 
sufficient. 
As the defendants acknowledged during oral argument, the statements “it’s 
unfair,” or “it’s against the public interest” would undoubtedly pass 
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of necessary executive sensitivity to the budgetary needs of the other two 
branches.139 
The governor also exercised the line-item veto on the 2017 General 
Appropriation Act to eliminate the funding for all institutions and entities 
involved in higher education. This included items that spanned twenty-
eight pages of the Act, with the following brief comment: 
The Senate refused to hold a hearing for nominated Regents for 
several higher education institutions. This is a clear violation of 
its constitutional duty. When the Senate appropriated three 
quarters of a billion dollars to these institutions, it also took the 
unprecedented step of refusing to hold a hearing for those 
responsible for the oversight of the appropriated public dollars. 
Both the funding for our higher education institutions and the 
confirmation of well-qualified regents can be addressed in the 
upcoming special session.140 
The governor signed the bill on April 7, which included the item 
vetoes of entire budget categories for the legislature and all institutions of 
higher education. An Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus 
challenging the vetoes of the legislative line-items and the higher education 
line-items was filed on April 21, 2017, alleging in its “Summary of the 
Bases for the Writ” as follows: 
The undue encroachment by one co-equal branch of 
government upon another, through the imposition of 
 
constitutional scrutiny as “objections.” Unlike “disapproved” these statements 
convey the reasons for disapproval; the sufficiency, rationality, or validity of 
which we will not question. “To disallow a veto for the complete absence of 
reasons is to establish an objective standard—one with which meddlesome 
courts cannot tamper. To disallow a veto because the Governor’s reasons are 
not ‘sufficient’ establishes a subjective standard that invites limitless mischief.”  
Romer, 840 P.2d at 1084–85 (citation omitted). The New Mexico Supreme Court recently 
followed this line of reasoning in affirming a district court judgment in another veto 
challenge by the legislature to ten bills returned to the house of origin by the governor 
without a statement of objections. See Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v. 
Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36731 (N.M. Apr. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/HSP2-CH8H. The 
court, in its Order of affirmance, ruled: “Article IV, § 22 of the New Mexico Constitutions 
requires that objections must accompany a returned bill . . . [and] . . . because the 
Governor’s objections did not accompany the returned bills at issue in this case, the bills 
became law three days after they were presented to the Governor for approval.” Id.  
 139. Out of respect for the co-equal branches, Hawaii’s Constitution allows for item 
vetoes, “[e]xcept for items appropriated to be expended by the judicial and legislative 
branches.” HAW. CONST. art. III, § 16. 
 140. N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, supra note 137, at 7. Although the governor 
mentions an “upcoming special session,” no proclamation for calling one had yet been 
issued. See N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 6.  
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improvident vetoes which attempt to eviscerate the ability of the 
other branch to perform its essential functions, violates the 
essence of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
In the present circumstances, the challenged line-item vetoes, 
which purported to remove all funding for the Legislative 
Branch, violate the doctrine of separation of powers and also 
are in derogation of Article IV of the New Mexico Constitution, 
which obligates the Legislature to fund the expenses of the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches. 
 
 The Constitution also prohibits the wholesale defunding, 
through a purported line-item veto, of our constitutionally-
enabled and statutorily-authorized institutions of higher 
education and other constitutionally-created departments, 
agencies, and state government institutions. As amplified below, 
a Writ of Mandamus is necessary and appropriate to invalidate 
the challenged vetoes and to restore the funding set forth in the 
General Appropriation Act.141 
Thus, the petition was primarily based on the claim that the governor 
could not use the item veto to eliminate all funding for the co-equal 
branches of government or the constitutionally created institutions of 
higher education.  
Three days later, the court requested a response, invited amicus 
participation from the New Mexico Council of University Presidents,142 
and set the matter for oral argument on May 15, 2017.143 On the day that 
the Governor’s Response and the Presidents’ Amicus Brief144 were filed, 
the governor issued a proclamation calling the legislature into special 
 
 141. Verified Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus at 1–2, State ex rel. 
The New Mexico Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. Apr. 21, 2017) 
(emphasis in original), https://perma.cc/B2G4-P7GB. 
 142. This invitation was not surprising because the Petition built an argument based on 
a letter from the President of the New Mexico Council of University Presidents to 
Governor Martinez objecting to the vetoes of funding for public colleges and universities. 
See id. at 7. 
 143. Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. 
Apr. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y4GS-GYER. 
 144. Perhaps most telling and politically powerful were the portions of the Presidents’ 
amicus curiae brief making note of the particularly critical and time sensitive concerns of 
the colleges and universities and the entities under their control. That brief argued the 
following three points: The threat to public health in New Mexico; the disruption of 
recruitment and retention of students, faculty and medical staff; and the acute budget 
uncertainty that has caused other problems for higher education. See Brief of the N.M. 
Council of Univ. Presidents as Amicus Curiae at 19, State ex rel. the Legislative Council v. 
Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/2YL7-RKKF. 
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session on May 24 to address the funding issues raised in the Petition.145 
Three days before the hearing on the Petition was to take place, the court 
issued an Order reciting the foregoing procedural history and ordered 
“that the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED AS NOT RIPE FOR 
REVIEW.”146 
The legislature met on May 24 and re-passed the previous 
appropriations to the legislature and the colleges. The bill, named the 
Supplemental General Appropriation Act of 2017, was signed into law by 
the governor on May 26.147 The bill avoided any further involvement by 
the court, beyond its previous orders calling for publicly filed briefs and its 
order stepping aside to allow for a necessary political resolution during the 
special session, which ultimately facilitated the resolution of the crisis. 
By doing so, the court avoided what otherwise would have been a 
constitutional crisis of grave and enormous proportions, no matter how it 
might have been resolved. If the planned veto eliminating all funding for 
the legislature had survived, it would have prevented the legislature from 
conducting its important interim activities between sessions. The veto, 
therefore, also would have impeded the ability of the legislature to 
function during the next scheduled regular session by eliminating all 
funding for legislators and legislative staff. Such a result would prevent one 
of the three co-equal branches from undertaking its constitutional 
functions, including its important checks-and-balances review over the 
 
 145. The Governor’s proclamation lists as the first “object” for which the session was 
called “[a] general appropriation act that provides specific funding for legislative agencies 
and institutions of higher education.” See Response to Verified Petition for Original Writ 
of Mandamus at Ex. A, State ex rel. the Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 
(N.M. May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/6AZM-2K82. 
 146. Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. 
May 11, 2017) (formatting in original), https://perma.cc/89YQ-MV6Z. The Legislative 
Council difficulty in New Mexico was taking place almost simultaneously with the even 
more complex difficulty surrounding the Minnesota item veto experience in Ninetieth 
Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017).  
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate involved a dispute over a tax bill that the governor allowed to 
pass as a temporary measure, but not without his veto of the appropriations for both the 
House and Senate, to lure the legislative leadership back to the bargaining table. Id. at 614. 
The Ninetieth Minn. State Senate court concluded that “the line-item vetoes did not violate 
Article III by effectively abolishing the Legislature,” but exercised “restraint on the 
coercion aspect of the Article III issue,” out of regard for the power of the parties “to 
resolve political disputes that arise in the course of . . . [the legislative] process,” and 
because “the Legislature has access to the funding it says it needs to continue its legislative 
functions until it reconvenes in the next regular session.” Id. at 612–13. As a result, the 
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate court remanded the case to the district court for entry of 
dismissal. Id. 
 147. See H. B. 1, 53d Leg., Spec. Sess. (N.M. 2017). 
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broad ranging activities of the executive branch of government that are a 
part of its legislative function.148 
On the other hand, if the court had ordered that the wholesale 
elimination of the funding was unconstitutional, it would have undermined 
the joint budget making function of the political branches.149 Courts are 
disinclined to conclude that the legislature can make its own demands on 
the treasury until such times as the political branches can agree on a 
budget.150 
The same concerns apply with respect to the wholesale veto of all 
higher education funding. Even though the state institutions of higher 
education are not “co-equal” branches of government, seven of the 
colleges and universities, as well as other educational and related 
institutions, have specific constitutional status.151 This status should perhaps 
afford them constitutional protection from the gubernatorial power to 
eliminate all of their funding, which would put them out of business for a 
 
 148. Prior New Mexico cases had not dealt with the extreme situation presented in 
Legislative Council, but there were suggestions in prior cases supporting this position. See, 
e.g., Thomson v. Legislative Audit Comm’n, 1968-NMSC-184, ¶¶ 16–17, 79 N.M. 693, 
697, 448 P.2d 799, 803 (stating that the legislature could not abolish the constitutionally 
established office of State Auditor, by taking away its fundamental functions or not properly 
funding the office); State ex rel. Prater v. State Bd. of Fin., 1955-NMSC-013, ¶ 11, 59 N.M. 
121, 127–28, 279 P.2d 1042, 1046 (declaring that were the appropriations of the Barbers’ 
Board so reduced “as to put it out of business as effectively as if repealed,” it would violate 
the constraining influence of N.M Const. art. IV, § 16 which mandates that a GAA shall 
embrace funding of the three branches of government). See also State ex rel. Nunez v. 
Baynard, 15 So. 2d 649, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1943) (holding that with respect to salaries of 
positions created in the constitution the legislature is bound to appropriate the funds to pay 
them, and the governor’s veto of these appropriations “was unconstitutional, null and 
void”).  
 149. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d at 612–13 (exercising restraint on 
one aspect of the constitutional challenge to the item veto of the legislative appropriation 
out of regard for the power of the parties “to resolve political disputes that arise in the 
course of [the legislative] process”). 
 150. In Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, however, both the Governor and the legislature 
stipulated that courts could order temporary funding for the legislature while the issue was 
resolved. 903 N.W.2d at 615. See also State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 
421, 431 (W. Va. 1973) (“We adhere to the maxim that the judiciary department possesses 
the inherent power to determine its needs and to obtain the funds necessary to fulfill such 
needs.”). 
 151. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 11 (establishing the constitutional basis of the 
following institutions: The University of New Mexico, New Mexico State University, New 
Mexico Highlands University, Western New Mexico University, Eastern New Mexico 
University, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; as well as the New Mexico 
Military Institute, New Mexico School for the Blind and Visually Impaired, New Mexico 
School for the Deaf, and Northern New Mexico State School). 
29
Browde: Separation of Powers in New Mexico: Item Vetoes, State Policy-Mak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO 453 
large part of an academic year. And, as argued in the University 
Presidents’ Brief, even the threat that funding might cease in a few months 
may have catastrophic implications for each institution of higher 
education.152 
With regard to the institutions of higher education, the governor’s 
position might be strengthened by the fact that, however viewed, the 
colleges and university are not equal branches, and in any case, they 
perform largely executive functions overseen by the Higher Education 
Department.153 The Secretary of the Higher Education Department is a 
member of the governor’s cabinet, and that authority coupled with the role 
that the governor plays in university oversight through the appointment of 
the board of regent, suggests a level of executive control not afforded with 
respect to the legislature or the courts.154 
The range and complexity of these arguments demonstrate that 
judicial restraint may, in some instances, be an appropriate choice, 
especially if other paths toward resolution are on the horizon. In this case, 
by allowing the filing of the Petition, requiring full briefing of the parties 
(including the university presidents), setting the case for an expeditious 
oral argument, and only then deciding not to hear the case on “ripeness” 
grounds, the court may have done everyone a favor. It thereby allowed for 
the political branches to honor their responsibilities and demonstrated that 
the power of the judiciary can sometimes be measured as much by what it 
does not do, as by what it does do.  
IV. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLES OVER SETTING STATE 
POLICY 
The item veto tug of war between the legislature and the governor, 
reviewed in the prior section, was often resolved by the court’s application 
of a highly functional approach. As noted earlier, formalism would not 
work well where both branches were relying on the conference of 
legislative power to each under article IV, section 22 of the state 
constitution.155 Thus, in resolving item veto cases, the court has often based 
its decision on whether manipulative drafting by the legislature 
overstepped the line into micromanaging the execution of the law or, 
 
 152. Brief of the N.M. Council of Univ. Presidents as Amicus Curiae at 9–18, State ex. 
rel. the Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. May 5, 2017). 
 153. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-25-1 et seq. (1978). 
 154. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-25-4 (1978). 
 155. For earlier discussions of formalism and functionalism in this context, see supra, 
notes 15–17 and 61–62.  
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alternatively, whether the governor’s veto improperly interfered with the 
legislative prerogative of fashioning state law.156 
Non-item veto struggles generally involve standalone actions by either 
the executive or the legislature.157 When such claims are made in New 
Mexico, the courts invoke the express separation-of-powers provision in 
the constitution.158 Those cases are more fundamentally based on the 
separate constitutional articles that define the powers of each, and the 
claim that the exercise of the power of one branch either exceeds the 
power granted to it, or encroaches on the constitutional power of the other 
branch. 
We turn now to case examples to further understand how separation-
of-powers operates in state constitutional law by examining two non-item 
veto matters that were brought as original actions in the New Mexico 
Supreme Court.159 These cases involved issues regarding which branch had 
the primary responsibility to exercise state authority over Indian gaming 
and welfare reform.160 Both cases raised federalism concerns because they 
also involved the exercise of state power under federal law. 
A. The Indian Gaming Dispute 
In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson,161 the Governor of New Mexico 
attempted to enter into contracts with various Indian tribes to permit 
Indian Gaming Enterprises on tribal lands in compliance with the Federal 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).162 IGRA does not mandate state 
authorization of tribal gaming, but requires authorization with respect to 
 
 156. State ex. rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 
P.2d 975, 980 (holding that “[t]he Legislature may not properly abridge [the Governor’s 
veto] power by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations, 
and the Governor may not properly distort legislative appropriations or arrogate unto 
himself the power of making appropriations by carefully striking words, phrases or 
sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.”). 
 157. See Winston David Holliday, Jr., Comment, Tipping the Balance of Power: A 
Critical Survey of the Gubernatorial Line Item Veto, 50 S.C. L. REV. 503 (1999). 
 158. That clause provides: “no person or collection of persons charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise 
expressly directed or permitted.” N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 159. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11; 
State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768. 
 160. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 1–2, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15; Taylor, 1998-
NMSC-015, ¶ 2, 125 N.M. at 346, 961 P.2d at 771. 
 161. 1995-NMSC-048, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11.  
 162. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (1995). 
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general, casino-like gaming (classified by IGRA as Class III gaming).163 
Federal law provides that such gaming “is lawful on Indian lands only if 
such activities are located in a state that ‘permits such gaming for any 
purpose by any person organization or entity, and [is] conducted in 
conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe 
and the State.’”164 While the outgoing governor had refused to undertake 
negotiations with respect to Class III gaming, Governor-elect Gary 
Johnson appointed a negotiator who agreed to compacts and revenue-
sharing agreements with several tribes. Governor Johnson signed these 
compacts soon after taking office.165 
A petition was filed thereafter, claiming that the governor “lacked the 
authority to commit New Mexico to these compacts and agreements, 
because he attempted to exercise legislative authority contrary to the 
doctrine of separation of powers expressed in the state Constitution.”166 In 
resolving the case, the New Mexico Supreme Court first reviewed its prior 
commitment to separation-of-powers as “fundamental in the structure of 
the federal government and the governments of all fifty states.”167 The 
court noted that the doctrine “‘allows some overlap in the exercise of 
governmental function.’”168 The court then asserted its necessary but 
reluctant intervention “when one branch of government unduly 
‘interfere[d] with or encroach[ed] on the authority or within the province 
 
 163. The brief history leading to the adoption of IGRA, the three classes of gaming the 
Act deals with, and the federal-state relationship in enforcing its provisions, is briefly 
described in Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 3–4, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15.  
 164. Id. ¶ 4, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15 (quoting 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(1)) 
(alteration in original). 
 165. Id. ¶ 8, 120 N.M. at 567, 904 P.2d at 16. 
 166. Id. ¶ 2, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15 (citing N.M. CONST. art. III. § 1; State 
ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992)). Before turning to the separation of 
powers issue, the court addressed a number of preliminary issues. Borrowing from part of 
the seminal State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 
decision dealing with related matters, the Clark court ruled that the original mandamus 
petition was properly brought; that a mandamus action may extend to both affirmative and 
prohibitory relief; that the tribes were not indispensable parties; and finally, that an 
expansive construction of state law seems to authorize other organizations in the state to 
engage in “casino-style” gaming, thereby triggering the applicability of IGRA’s directions 
with respect to Class III gaming, but in any event, the governor has taken a course contrary 
to the legislatures “expressed . . . public policy against unrestricted gaming.” Clark, 1995-
NMSC-048 at ¶¶ 14–30, 120 N.M. at 568–72, 904 P.2d at 17–21. 
 167. Id. ¶ 31, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22. 
 168. Id. ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (quoting Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC 
113, ¶ 25, 95 N.M. 48, 54, 618 P.2d 886, 892). 
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of’ a coordinate branch of government.”169 The court first articulated its 
task in markedly formalistic terms: 
If the entry into the compacts reasonably can be viewed as the 
execution of law, we would have no difficulty recognizing the 
attempt as within the Governor’s authority as the State’s chief 
executive officer. If, on the other hand, his actions in fact 
conflict with or infringe upon what is the essence of legislative 
authority—the making of law—then the Governor has exceeded 
his authority.170  
The court then concluded: “We have no doubt that the compact . . . 
does not execute existing New Mexico statutory or case law, but that it is 
instead an attempt to create new law.”171  
Not satisfied to end the matter there under its apparent formalistic 
approach, the court, citing Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,172 
made clear that it would apply its test to determine “whether the 
Governor’s action disrupts the proper balance between the executive and 
legislative branches.”173 This functional turn allowed the court to list and 
rely upon a number of ways in which the governor’s action worked as an 
“undue disruption of legislative authority.” Those included: 
[a.] The Governor’s present authority could not preclude future 
legislative action, and he could not execute an agreement that 
foreclosed inconsistent legislative action or precluded the 
application of such legislation to the agreement. The compact . . 
. cannot be said to be consistent with these principles [because] 
[t]he terms of the compact . . . give the Tribe a virtually 
irrevocable and seemingly perpetual right to conduct any form 
of Class III gaming permitted in New Mexico on the date the 
Governor signed the agreement.174 
 
 169. Id. ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (quoting Mowrer, 1980-NMSC 113 at ¶ 
28, 95 N.M. at 54, 618 P.2d at 892). Mowrer also held, inter alia, that “any statute, which 
requires that the judiciary first submit its requested budget to the mayor or any part of the 
executive branch of government prior to submitting the same to the legislative branch of 
government is unconstitutional as violative of Article III of the Constitution of New 
Mexico.” Mowrer, 1980-NMSC 113 at ¶ 6, 95 N.M. at 50–51, 618 P.2d at 888–89. It is 
prior holdings like Mowrer that bolster the suggestion that if State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez, 
2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276 had been litigated to conclusion in favor 
of the legislature, it might have had broad implications by limiting executive line-item 
authority over judicial appropriations.  
 170. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 33, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22. 
 171. Id. ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22. 
 172. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
 173. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23. 
 174. Id. ¶¶ 34–35, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23. 
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[b.] While the legislature might authorize the Governor to enter 
into a gaming compact or ratify his actions with respect to a 
compact he has negotiated, the Governor cannot enter into such 
a compact solely on his own authority.175 
 
[c.] Whether or not the legislature, if given an opportunity to 
address the issue of the various gaming compacts, would favor a 
more restrictive approach consistent with its actions in the past 
constitutes a legislative policy decision. . . . By entering into such 
a permissive compact[,] . . . the Governor contravened the 
legislature’s expressed aversion to commercial gambling and 
exceeded his authority as this State’s chief executive officer.176 
The court faced a federal preemption-based argument made by the 
governor, who claimed that “even if he lacked authority under state law to 
enter into the compact, it is nonetheless binding upon the State . . . as a 
matter of federal law,” and that regardless of whether he has such authority 
as a matter of state law, “he possesses the authority, as a matter of federal 
law. . . .”177 Both claims were summarily rejected by the court because 
“[t]he Governor has only such authority as is given to him by our state 
constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to it.”178 The court did not 
believe that Congress “sought to invest state governors with powers in 
excess of those that the governors possess under state law.”179 Finally, 
recognizing that the Federal Congress could enact legislation “legalizing all 
forms of gambling on all Indian lands,” the court emphasized that rather 
than doing that, IGRA “sought to give the states a role in the process” by 
authorizing state officials, “acting pursuant to their authority held under 
state law, to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state.”180 
Clark came at the end of an understandable political battle between 
one party, whose governor opposed the infusion of generalized casino 
 
 175. Id. ¶ 36, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23. 
 176. Id. ¶ 37, 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24 (emphasis added). Having resolved the 
constitutional separation of powers issue, the court also rejected gubernatorial claims that 
the Governor’s actions were authorized under two state statutes. See id. ¶¶ 41–43, 120 
N.M. at 576–77, 904 P.2d at 25–26. 
 177. Id. ¶ 44, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26 (emphasis in original). In reciting the 
facts of the case, the court mentioned that the Governor’s compacts had been approved by 
the Secretary of Interior, but no federal preemption argument on that basis seems to have 
been made, although the Governor presented such an argument in the welfare case which 
is next treated in this section. Id. ¶ 8, 120 N.M. at 567, 904 P.2d at 16. 
 178. Id. ¶ 44, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. ¶ 45, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26 (emphasis added). 
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gambling in the state through the IGRA process, and the opposing party, 
whose gubernatorial candidate endorsed such infusion and won the next 
election. Clark, however, forced the issue of Indian gaming back into the 
legislative arena, where the issue necessarily became not whether there 
would be Indian gaming, but rather in what form and under what 
regulatory regime.181 In the process, the court was able, rather easily, to 
conclude that the matter of compacting with the Indian tribes involved so 
many issues of state policy that the legislative’s role must be primary.182 
B. The Welfare Litigation 
The New Mexico Supreme Court seemed to speak clearly on the 
matter in Clark. Nevertheless, a similar executive and legislative struggle 
had to play out again regarding the extensive changes in the essential 
federal-state partnership to create and carry out a cornerstone program of 
the Social Security system dealing with the care of the needy. In State ex 
rel. Taylor v. Johnson,183 the governor engaged in a replay of the script he 
tried to administer in Clark—exercising his executive authority to create a 
new welfare program in the wake of a new federal welfare statute. This 
time, however, the executive action came after the state legislature had 
adopted a new state statutory regime in compliance with the federal law 
that the governor vetoed.184  
As explained in Taylor, the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program (AFDC) was adopted as part of the Social Security Act 
of 1935 and created “a new federal-state public assistance partnership” in 
which the federal government “established the primary framework for 
public assistance programs and offered funding for states that 
implemented their programs.”185 New Mexico signed on in 1937 with the 
adoption of the Public Assistance Act (NMPAA), allowing the state to 
participate in the federal program and obtain significant federal funds for 
the benefit of its needy population.186 That partnership between the federal 
and state governments continued over several decades with a number of 
adjustments and additions.187 A major change, however, occurred with the 
passage of the Federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 
 181. Id. ¶ 42–43, 120 N.M. at 576–77, 904 P.2d at 25–26. 
 182. Id. ¶ 47, 120 N.M. at 577–78, P.2d 26–27. 
 183. 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768. 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 6–12, 125 N.M. at 346–47, 961 P.2d at 771–72.  
 185. Id. ¶ 6, 125 N.M. at 346, 961 P.2d at 771. 
 186. Id. ¶ 7, 125 N.M. at 346–47, 961 P.2d at 771–72. 
 187. Id. ¶ 8, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772 (including the addition of the food 
stamp and medical assistance programs). 
35
Browde: Separation of Powers in New Mexico: Item Vetoes, State Policy-Mak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO 459 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA).188 The PRA repealed several constraints 
on the states, gave them greater flexibility, and replaced the AFDC 
structure with a block-grant program called Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF). In anticipation of the impending federal law, the 
governor submitted his proposal to the state legislature, which failed to 
gain legislative approval and presaged a political fight not unlike the fight 
over the state’s role in Indian gaming.189 
After the Federal PRA became law, the New Mexico Legislature 
responded with the passage of its own Family Assistance and Individual 
Responsibility Act (FAIR) to accommodate TANF requirements and 
provide authorization to the New Mexico Human Services Department 
(HSD) to administer the program.190 The governor vetoed the FAIR bill 
and item vetoed the funds for it in the General Appropriation Act. In his 
veto message, the governor stated that “he possessed authority to exercise 
the discretion left to the states under the [federal] PRA [arguing] that the 
proposed state legislation encroached upon the executive’s authority.”191 
He then announced the creation of his own public assistance reform 
program labeled “PROGRESS,” which HSD sought to implement 
through its regulatory process.192 The instant action was then brought 
seeking a writ of mandamus to enjoin the governor’s program.193 
After briefing and oral argument by the parties, the court ruled from 
the bench against the governor’s exercise of executive authority because it 
was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. The court 
ordered the respondents to: 
a) desist from the implementation of their PROGRESS 
program, and b) to administer the Public Assistance Program in 
full compliance with New Mexico statutes until such time as 
existing law is altered or amended by the passage of a bill by the 
state legislature which is then signed into law by the governor in 
accordance with the provisions of the New Mexico 
Constitution.194 
The governor and his HSD Secretary failed to follow that order. This 
led to a subsequent hearing that resulted in another order, which held the 
respondents in contempt. The issuance of the court’s formal opinion 
 
 188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–609 (1997). 
 189. State ex rel. Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶ ¶ 11–12, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 
772. 
 190. Id. ¶ 10, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772. 
 191. Id. ¶ 11, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772. 
 192. Id. ¶ 12, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772. 
 193. Id. ¶ 13, 125 N.M. at 347–48, 961 P.2d at 772–73. 
 194. Id. ¶ 13 125 N.M. at 348, 961 P.2d at 773. 
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followed. The opinion fully elaborated on the court’s separation-of-powers 
reasoning underlying its initial ruling, as well as the basis of its contempt 
ruling.195 
After reviewing the propriety of the mandamus petition in this case,196 
the court dealt with the respondents’ arguments, which maintained that:  
[A]s agents of the executive branch, they may implement the 
policy changes [in the welfare program] without seeking the 
direct participation of the Legislature . . . [T]he Legislature 
conferred discretionary authority upon HSD to . . . enact all 
regulations necessary to secure federal public assistance funds 
[and] that New Mexico and federal law compelled them to 
make the policy changes.197 
The court repeated its discourse from the recent Clark decision on 
the importance of separation-of-powers to the structure of government, the 
non-absolute nature of the doctrine, and the need for the court to ensure 
“‘the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches.’”198 
The court went on to elaborate on the application of the Clark balancing 
test in the context of this case: 
A violation [of the separation of powers] occurs when the 
Executive, rather than the Legislature, determines “how, when, 
and for what purpose the public funds shall be applied in 
carrying on the government . . . ”199 [I]nfringement upon 
legislative power may also occur where the executive does not 
“execute existing . . . statutory or case law [and rather attempts] 
to create new law.”200 
Applying the Clark principles here, the court concluded that 
“Respondents’ program implement[ed] the type of substantive policy 
changes reserved to the Legislature [because] [t]heir changes substantially 
altered, modified, and extended existing law governing . . . public 
assistance in New Mexico,”201 and attempted “to foreclose legislative action 
 
 195. See id. ¶¶ 14–66, 125 N.M. at 348–57, 961 P.2d at 773–82. 
 196. See id. ¶¶ 14–18, 125 N.M. at 348–49, 961 P.2d at 773–74. The court reiterated 
its earlier discussion of mandamus in the cases discussed earlier. See cases cited supra note 
160. 
 197. Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶ 19, 125 N.M. at 349, 961 P.2d at 774.  
 198. Id. ¶ 24, 125 N.M. at 350, 961 P.2d at 775 (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. 
Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 34, 120 N.M. 562, 574, 904 P.2d 11, 23. 
 199. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-83, ¶ 14, 120 N.M. 
820, 825, 907 P.2d 1001, 1006 (holding that a statute conferring fiscal authority on the 
governor did not provide sufficient standards to allow the governor to act contrary to 
existing legislative policy choices)). 
 200. Id. (quoting Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22). 
 201. Id. ¶ 25, 125 N.M. at 350, 961 P.2d at 775. 
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. . . where legislative authority [wa]s undisputed.”202 That led the court to 
expressly hold that “[r]espondents’ program constitute[d] executive 
creation of substantive law, and as such, [wa]s an unconstitutional 
encroachment upon the Legislature’s role of declaring public policy.”203 
The court then bolstered its holding by listing numerous ways in 
which the executive plan would work substantive adjustments to public 
assistance policy.204 All of which, by their very nature, set fundamental 
standards and made vital policy choices—both roles reserved for the 
legislature under article IV, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.205 
These adjustments were consistent with past practices involving public 
assistance changes, leading the court to reiterate its conclusion that “[b]y 
implementing their plan through HSD regulations rather than through the 
required legislative process, Respondents made these core policy choices 
themselves, thereby preventing the constitutionally required input of the 
people’s elected law-making representatives.”206 
The court similarly rejected the governor’s claim that he was 
authorized by either state or federal law to act alone in creating his new 
public assistance program,207 leading to yet a third restatement of its 
holding: 
Because the substantive public assistance policy changes 
promulgated in Respondents’ plan required legislative 
participation and because neither state statute nor federal law 
conferred discretionary authority upon Respondents to institute 
the policy changes, we conclude that Respondents violated 
Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.208 
 
 202. Id. (quoting Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22). 
 203. Id. This holding continues the court’s practice of melding formalism (the focus 
on the “legislative” nature of the activity), with functionalism (the degree of encroachment 
on the function of the other branch), as the operational test for violation of separation of 
powers. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 204. The court explained that the executive plan would deny the legislature “any 
participation” in the following policy choices: the definition of “dependency” for public 
assistance benefits; setting mandatory work requirements that might exceed those required 
by federal law; determining whether entitlement to benefits are to be maintained; and the 
setting of durational limits. See Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶¶ 27–30, 125 N.M. at 350–51, 
961 P.2d at 775–76. 
 205. Id. ¶ 31, 125 N.M. at 351, 961 P.2d at 776. 
 206. Id. ¶ 33, 125 N.M. at 352, 961 P.2d at 777. 
 207. Id. ¶¶ 34–48, 125 N.M. at 352–54, 961 P.2d at 777–79. 
 208. Id. ¶ 49, 125 N.M. at 355, 961 P.2d at 781. The remainder of the opinion dealt 
with the need for and content of the court’s further order of indirect civil contempt, and 
what was required for the Respondents to be able to purge themselves of that contempt. Id. 
¶¶ 50–65, 125 N.M. at 355–57, 961 P.2d at 780–82. 
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Thus, Taylor provided an opportunity to apply the clear principles 
established in Clark. Given the governor’s brazen disregard of legislative 
prerogatives, the court may have purposefully used the case as an 
opportunity to reemphasize and elaborate at length on the executive’s lack 
of authority to formulate policy without constitutional or legislative 
authority. The court did so by listing in detail the number of ways the 
governor’s actions either interfered with or foreclosed the essential 
legislative role in setting state policy. The court thus left as broad a 
precedent on the matter as it could, while also asserting a broad 
federalism-based power of the state to exercise the full range of its power 
in programs involving cooperative federalism, so long as that authority is 
expressed through legislative processes. Finally, to rein in excessive 
executive power, the court highlighted its own power to insist on the 
sanctity of judicial orders as an important cornerstone of the rule of law. 
The warning to future governors on this subject could not have been 
clearer.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of separation-of-powers was fraught with practical 
difficulties from the beginning. The hope of the Framers of the late 
eighteenth century might have been for a constructive tension usually 
resolved by a healthy dose of self-restraint on the part of the political 
branches when dealing with one another. Nonetheless, with the rise of 
political parties, at both the federal and state level, the seeds had been 
sewn to allow for what Professor Schlessinger much later described as 
“permanent guerrilla warfare,” often requiring judicial intervention to 
resolve.209 
Similarly, the item veto was initially seen as a “good government” 
addition to the constitutions of the states to help check against budgetary 
excesses and provide an orderly assistance to balance budgets. But that 
device, too—especially when expanded (as in New Mexico) to allow item 
veto of more than “items of appropriation”—necessarily leads to 
manipulative legislative and gubernatorial struggles over much more than 
dollar amounts. The New Mexico experience, however, has some salutary 
features that followed from the court’s careful attempt to articulate neutral 
principles to guide the judicial evaluation of cases brought to resolve inter-
branch item veto disputes. 
The Sego/Coll principles—articulating the court’s dual policing role to 
protect each branch from the damaging interventions of the other—do 
 
 209. See Schlesinger, supra note 24.  
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provide guideposts for both executive and legislative actors. Indeed, the 
author has personally observed Legislative Counsel Service staff being able 
to use those principles in advising the legislative drafting process, and one 
can assume that similar advisement takes place in the executive branch 
with respect to proposed gubernatorial vetoes. Difficulties, however, will 
remain when complex problems arise, like those presented in Stewart and 
Cisneros; the latter having created opportunities for future arguments to 
avoid the Sego/Coll principles. 
Furthermore, special circumstances are always presented when the 
courts are confronted with non-item veto, separation-of-powers cases 
where the executive tries to take preemptive action to assert executive 
authority and diminish or foreclose legislative authority in matters that 
require critical decisions concerning state policy. When matters like that 
arise, as they did in Clark and Taylor, state courts like ours will be ever 
vigilant to protect the essential legislative prerogatives and redress the 
proper balance between legislative and executive power.  
Finally, another value comes from New Mexico’s extensive judicial 
involvement in these matters. An experienced court with a well-developed 
separation of power and item veto jurisprudence, and extensive experience 
with such matters, can be trusted to delve deeply in these cases when 
necessary and also exercise restrain when advisable, not out of timidity, but 
from an understanding that on some occasions judicial inaction may be an 
effective tool in reaching accommodation. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF STATE ITEM VETO PROVISIONS 
 
State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions210 














(Ala. Const.  § 126) 
(“disapprove any item 




X   
Alaska 
(Alaska Const. art. II, § 
15) (“strike or reduce 
items in appropriation 
bills”)211 
X  X 
Arizona 
(Ariz. Const. art. V, § 
7) (“If any bill … 
contains several items 
of appropriations of 
money, he may object 
to one or more of such 
items”) 
X   
Arkansas 
(Ark. Const. art. VI, § 
17) (“disapprove any 





X   
 
 210. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
 211. In Alaska, line item vetoes overrides require an affirmative vote by three-quarters 
of the legislature, instead of only two-thirds for standard vetoes.  See Alaska Const. art. II, § 
15. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions212 














(Cal. Const. art. IV, § 
10) (“reduce or 
eliminate one or more 
items of 
appropriation”) 
X  X 
Colorado 
(Colo. Const. art. IV, § 
12) (“disapprove of any 
item or items of any bill 
making appropriations 
of money, embracing 
distinct items”) 
X   
Connecticut 
(Conn. Const. art. IV, § 
16) (“disapprove of any 
item or items of any bill 
making appropriations 
of money embracing 
distinct”) 
X   
Delaware 
(Del. Const. art. III, 
§18) (“disapprove of 
any item or items of 





X   
Florida 
(Fla. Const. art. III, § 
8) (“veto any specific 
appropriation in a 
general appropriation 
bill, but may not veto 
any qualification or 
restriction without also 
vetoing the 
appropriation to which 
it relates”) 
X   
 
 212. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions213 














(Ga. Const. art. III, § 5, 
¶ XIII) (“approve any 
appropriation and veto 
any other 
appropriation in the 
same bill”) 
X   
Idaho 
(Idaho Const. art. IV, § 
11) (“disapprove of any 
item or items of any bill 
making appropriations 
of money embracing 
distinct items”) 
X   
Illinois214 
(Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9) 
(“reduce or veto any 
item of appropriations 
in a bill”) 
X  X 
Iowa 
(Iowa Const. art. III, § 
16) (“disapprove any 
item of an 
appropriation bill”) 
X   
Kansas 
(Kan. Const. art. II, § 
14) (“If any bill … 
contains several items 
of appropriation of 
money, one or more of 
such items may be 
disapproved”) 
X   
Kentucky 
(Ky. Const. § 88) 
(“disapprove any part 




 X  
 
 213. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
 214. If the governor reduces the amount of a line-item in Illinois, only a majority vote 
is required to override this reduction. Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions215 














(La. Const. Ann. art. 
IV, § 5) (“veto any line 
item in an 
appropriation bill”) 
 
X   
Maine216 
(Me. Const. art. IV, Pt. 
3, § 2-A) (“disapprove 
any dollar amount 
appearing in an 
appropriation section 
or allocation section, or 
both, of an enacted 
legislative document . . 
. [and] replace the 
dollar amount with one 
that does not result in 
an increase in an 
appropriation or 
allocation or a decrease 
in a deappropriation or 
deallocation”) 
X  X 
Maryland 
(Md. Const. art. II, § 
17) (“disapprove of any 





X   
Massachusetts 
(Mass. Const. art. 
LXIII, § 5) 
(“disapprove or reduce 
items or parts of items 
in any bill 
appropriating money”) 
 
X  X 
 
 215. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
 216. The line-item veto in Maine can be overridden with a simple majority vote. Me. 
Const. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 2-A. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions217 














(Mich. Const. Art. 5, § 
19) (“disapprove any 
distinct item or items 
appropriating moneys 
in any appropriation 
bill”) 
X   
Minnesota 
(Minn. Const. art. IV, § 
23) (“If a bill … 
contains several items 
of appropriation of 
money, he may veto 
one or more of the 
items”) 
X   
Mississippi 
(Miss. Const., § 73) 
(“veto parts of any 
appropriation bill”) 
X   
Missouri218 
(Mo. Const. art. IV, § 
26) (“object to one or 
more items or portions 
of items of 
appropriation of 
money in any bill”) 
 X X 
Montana 
(Mont. Const. art. VI, § 
10) (“may veto items in 
appropriation bills”) 
 X  
 
 217. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
 218. Appropriations for free public schools, or for the payment of principal and 
interest on the public debt are not subject to line-item veto in Missouri. Mo. Const. art. IV, 
§ 26 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions219 














(Neb. Const. art. IV, § 
15) (“may disapprove 
or reduce any item or 
items of 
appropriation”) 
X  X 
New Jersey  
(N.J. Const. art. V, § I, 
¶ 15) (“may object in 
whole or in part to any 
such item or items” of 
appropriation) 
X   
New Mexico 
(N.M. Const. art. IV, § 
22) (“may . . . approve 
or disapprove any part 
or parts, item or items, 
of any bill 
appropriating money”) 
 X  
New York  
(N.Y. Const. art IV, § 
7) (“may object to one 
or more of . . . items” 
in appropriation bills) 
 X  
North Dakota 
(N.D. Const. art. V, § 
9) (“may veto items in 
an appropriation bill.”) 
 
 X  
Ohio  
(Ohio Const. art. II, § 
16) (“may disapprove 
any item or items in 
any bill making an 
appropriation of 
money”) 
 X  
 
 219. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions220 














(Okla. Const. art. VI, § 
12) (may disapprove 
“any item” of any bill of 
appropriation.) 
 X  
Oregon 
(Or. Const. art. V, § 
15a) (“power to veto 
single items in 
appropriation bills.”) 
 X  
Pennsylvania 
(Pa. Const. art. IV, § 
16) (“power to 
disapprove of any item 
or items of any bill, 
making appropriations 
of money, embracing 
distinct items, and the 
part or parts of the bill 
approved shall be the 
law”) 
X221  X222 
South Carolina 
(S.C. Const. art. IV, § 
21) (may “approve any 
one or more of the 
items or sections 
contained in any bill 
appropriating money”) 
 X  
 
 220. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
 221. While Pennsylvania’s item veto provision allows the governor to veto “any item” 
of an appropriation bill, the vetoed item must—at minimum—include an appropriation. 
Jubelirer v. Rendell, 598 Pa. 16, 22, 953 A.2d 514 (2008). 
 222. Although Pennsylvania’s item veto provision does not explicitly allow the 
governor to reduce appropriation amounts, Pennsylvania’s highest court has found that the 
item veto provision allows the governor to “decrease” an appropriation amount in an 
appropriation bill. Id., at 48. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions223 














(S.D. Const. art. IV, § 
4) (“may strike any 
items of any bill passed 
by the Legislature 
making 
appropriations”) 
 X  
Tennessee 
(Tenn. Const. art. III, § 
18) (“may reduce or 
disapprove the sum of 
money appropriated by 
any one or more items 
or parts of items in any 
bill appropriating 
money”) 
X  X 
Texas 
(Tex. Const. art. IV, § 
14) (“may object to 




X   
Utah 
(Utah Const. art. VII, § 
8) (“may disapprove 
any item of 
appropriation 
contained in any bill”) 
X   
Virginia  
(Va. Const. art. V, § 6) 
(may “veto any 
particular item or items 
of an appropriation 
bill”) 
 X  
 
 223. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
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State Constitution Line-
Item Veto Provisions224 














(Wash. Const. art. III, 
§ 12) (“may object to 
one or more sections 
or appropriation 
items”) 
X   
West Virginia 
(W. Va. Const. art. VI, 
§ 51) (“may veto [an 
appropriation bill], or 
he may disapprove or 
reduce items or parts 
of items contained 
therein”) 
 X X 
Wisconsin 
(Wis. Const. art. V, § 
10) (“Appropriation 
bills may be 
approved in whole or 
in part by the 
governor.”) 
 X  
Wyoming 
(Wyo. Const. art. IV, § 
9) (may “disapprove of 
any item or items or 
part or parts of any 
[appropriation bill]”) 












 224. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto 
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode 
Island; and (6) Vermont. 
49
Browde: Separation of Powers in New Mexico: Item Vetoes, State Policy-Mak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO 473 
APPENDIX B: GENERAL APPROPRIATION ACT OF 2017 
 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS AND FINANCE COMMITTEE 
SUBSTITUTE FOR HOUSE BILLS 2 AND 3 
 





MAKING GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS AND AUTHORIZING 
EXPENDITURES BY STATE AGENCIES REQUIRED BY LAW. 
 




Section 1. SHORT TITLE.--This act may be cited as the "General 
Appropriation Act of 2017". 
 
Section 2. DEFINITIONS.--As used in the General Appropriation Act of 
2017: 
 
[The author has omitted Section 2's definitions.] 
  
Section 3. GENERAL PROVISIONS.-- 
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Appropriations: 5,660.0    5,660.0 
Subtotal [5,660.0]    5,660.0 
      
LEGISLATURE:      
Appropriations: 1,386.0    1,386.0 
Subtotal [1,386.0]    1,386.0 
      
LEGISLATIVE 
FINANCE COMM.: 
     
Appropriations: 4,220.3    4,220.3 
Subtotal [4,220.3]    4,220.3 
      
SENATE CHIEF 
CLERK: 
     
Appropriations: 1,130.3    1,130.3 
Subtotal [1,130.3]    1,130.3 
      
HOUSE CHIEF CLERK: 1,097.7    1,097.7 
Appropriations: [1,097.7]    1,097.7 
Subtotal      




     
Appropriations: 1,233.4    1,233.4 
Subtotal [1,233.4]    1,233.4 
      
LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL SERVICE: 
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LEGISLATIVE 
BUILDING SERVICES: 
     
Appropriations: 4,054.9    4,054.9 
Subtotal [4,054.9]    4,054.9 
      
TOTAL LEGISLATIVE 18,782.6    18,782.6 
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